bypass v5.10.228257.2253 (dll malware, QQ pass)

  1. I double click on the photo.exe.

It can terminate the existing process of QQ IM software.

2.Then, I restart QQ IM and type some words on the window of it.

The photo.exe can connect to the internet.

3.comodo trusts the photo.exe which is injected with the MSDTCTM.dll.

4.The malware creates an autorun entry.

5.environment:

Windows XP SP3 32bit

do you have a virustotal of the photo.exe

MSDTCTM.dll

https://valkyrie.comodo.com/Result.html?sha1=9c681206752576e9a4a37ade967c4e2c0111105d&&query=1&&filename=msdtctm.dll

photo.exe

https://valkyrie.comodo.com/Result.html?sha1=44e0e5af367432eeacfc1257083bf8605229fed0&&query=1&&filename=photo.exe

can you open up kill switch and show me the active processes and then show me the associated dll’s with the photo.exe and QQ?

Hi a256886572008,

We are looking into this issue and provide a fix as soon as possible.

Thank you for reporting it!

Regards,
Ionel

2.The malware puts a transparent window on the window of QQ IM.

So, it can connect to the internet, after the user types some words on that.

Аlmost half a year has passed since the first reports of this problem.
https://forums.comodo.com/news-announcements-feedback-cis/allegation-of-comodo-defence-plus-byapssed-by-zeroaccess-rootkit-t79079.0.html
Seems will have to wait another six months, up to version CIS 6…

:-TU :-TU :-TU
plz fix it as soon as possible, thx!

Oh well… The chances of you walking into such malware is low same as ransom…

Current CIS can likely be made to stop this with D+ rules… will it cut into compatibility and stability? maybe.

Automatically sandbox process whose modules contain unrecognized files ?

Well maybe not like that with the current version thats more 6.0. I mean I could make a custom rule for Photo.exe to prevent it from getting infected.

In Defence+, Would changing from “partially limited” to “limited” solve this?

comodo would still trust the malware.

This is a very serious issue. Is any Deve looking into it ?

so from what I can tell this is what is happening, a trusted file is loading malware into memory and if the AV does not catching it, it would bypass. Is that what you are saying?

another sample:

enlpu.dll (50.1MB)
https://valkyrie.comodo.com/Result.html?sha1=929f6b272fc399fb1abc06801d52e844685f83fd&&query=0&&filename=enlpu.rar

MSUpdates.exe
https://valkyrie.comodo.com/Result.html?sha1=f7f57137a029457f132ae63c1b41eac24ac21524&&query=0&&filename=msupdates.exe


2012-05-22 15:14:22 C:\Documents and Settings\Roger\桌面\virus\WindowsUpdate\MSUpdates.exe Sandboxed As Partially Limited

2012-05-22 15:14:24 C:\Documents and Settings\Roger\桌面\virus\WindowsUpdate\MSUpdates.exe Modify Key HKUS\S-1-5-21-1993962763-796845957-1801674531-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ProxyEnable

2012-05-22 15:14:24 C:\WINDOWS\Explorer.EXE Sandboxed As Partially Limited

2012-05-22 15:14:25 c:\hds1.exe Sandboxed As Partially Limited

2012-05-22 15:14:27 C:\WINDOWS\system32\conime.exe Sandboxed As Partially Limited

2012-05-22 15:14:27 c:\hds2.exe Sandboxed As Partially Limited

2012-05-22 15:14:30 c:\hds3.exe Sandboxed As Partially Limited

2012-05-22 15:14:30 C:\Documents and Settings\Roger\桌面\virus\WindowsUpdate\MSUpdates.exe Access Memory C:\WINDOWS\explorer.exe

2012-05-22 15:14:44 C:\WINDOWS\system32\userinit.exe Modify Key HKUS\S-1-5-21-1993962763-796845957-1801674531-1003\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Device

2012-05-22 15:14:52 C:\WINDOWS\system32\userinit.exe Access COM Interface \RPC Control\spoolss

turning security to proactive will stop that, in the stock internet security mode the firewall lets anything out basically.

Because CIS trusts the MSUpdates.exe, it was bypassed by the malware.

MSUPdates.exe is not trusted as it gets sandboxed. Or did you sandbox if manually for testing or instruction purposes?