I avoid Installer / Updaters like the plague, albeit it IS necessary when utilized judiciously.
For Internet Explorer the following are examples of resource access permissions that implement wildcards.
Key for below permissions:
Environmental variables:
%SYSTEMDRIVE% = drive letter allocation for system installation
%SYSROOT32% = %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Windows\system32
[GUID] is some arbitrary value that remains constant for current user
Replace discrete value for [USER_NAME] with * if this is an issue for multiple log-ins.
? = matches any single character
- = matches any number of characters
run executable:
%PROGRAMFILES%\Microsoft Silverlight\5.1.???.0\agcp.exe
%PROGRAMFILES%\Microsoft Silverlight\5.1.???.0\Silverlight.Configuration.exe
%SYSTEMDRIVE%\Documents and Settings[USER_NAME]\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5*\install_flashplayer11x32axau_gtbd_chrd_dn_aih[1].exe
protected files / folders:
%SYSROOT32%\Macromed\Flash*
%SYSTEMDRIVE%\Documents and Settings[USER_NAME]\Application Data\Macromedia\Flash Player\macromedia.com\support\flashplayer\sys#*
%SYSTEMDRIVE%\Documents and Settings[USER_NAME]\Application Data\Macromedia\Flash Player#SharedObjects[GUID]*
%SYSTEMDRIVE%\Documents and Settings[USER_NAME]\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5*\install_flashplayer11x32axau_gtbd_chrd_dn_aih[1].exe
For the Adobe updates, the following have been implemented:
I’ve created a File Group ‘Adobe Flash ActiveX’ containing:
%SYSROOT32%\Macromed\Flash\FlashUtil11?ActiveX.exe
%SYSROOT32%\Macromed\Flash\FlashUtil32_11_2_202???ActiveX.exe
%SYSROOT32%\Macromed\Flash\FlashUtil32_11_4_402???ActiveX.exe
%SYSROOT32%\Macromed\Flash\FlashUtil32_11_5??????ActiveX.exe
%SYSROOT32%\Macromed\Flash\FlashUtil32_11_6??????_ActiveX.exe
File Group ‘Install Flash’:
%SYSTEMDRIVE%\Documents and Settings[USER_NAME]\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5*\install_flashplayer11x32axau_gtbd_chrd_dn_ai[1].exe
%SYSTEMDRIVE%\Documents and Settings[USER_NAME]\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5*\install_flashplayer11x32axau_gtbd_chrd_dn_aih[1].exe
%SYSTEMDRIVE%\Documents and Settings[USER_NAME]\Local Settings\Temp\install_flashplayer11x32axau_gtbd_chrd_dn_aih[1].exe
%SYSTEMDRIVE%\Documents and Settings[USER_NAME]\Local Settings\Temp\install_flashplayer11x32axau_gtbd_chrd_dn_aih[1]_?.exe
I’ve created custom policy for ‘Adobe Flash ActiveX’
run executable:
%SYSTEMDRIVE%\Documents and Settings[USER_NAME] \Local Settings\Temp?.dir\InstallFlashPlayer.exe
%SYSTEMDRIVE%\Documents and Settings[USER_NAME] \Local Settings\Temp{???-???-???-???-???}\InstallFlashPlayer.exe
%PROGRAMILES\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe
Windows Messages:
%SYSROOT32%\csrss.exe
%ProgramFiles%\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe
Protected registry:
HKUS\S-1-5-21-[GUID]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections\SavedLegacySettings
Protected files / folders:
%SYSROOT32%\Macromed\Flash
%SYSROOT32%\Macromed\Flash\FlashInstall.log
%SYSROOT32%\Macromed\Flash\FlashUtil11?ActiveX.exe
%SYSROOT32%\Macromed\Flash\FlashUtil32_11_2_202???ActiveX.exe
%SYSROOT32%\Macromed\Flash\FlashUtil32_11_4_402???ActiveX.exe
%SYSROOT32%\Macromed\Flash\FlashUtil32_11_5??????ActiveX.exe
%SYSROOT32%\Macromed\Flash\FlashUtil32_11_6??????_ActiveX.exe
%SYSTEMDRIVE%\Documents and Settings[USER_NAME]\Local Settings\Temp*\InstallFlashPlayer.exe
The ‘Install Flash’ File Group is implemented exclusively in the firewall rule configuration (it has no D+ resource access permissions defined); ‘Adobe Flash ActiveX’ FIle Group is implemented in both D+ & Firewall configuration.
I implement similar strategy for other notorious pop-up offenders, e.g. Java and Windows updates. For the former, in addition to any wildcards pertainent to paths, I implement %JAVA% environmental variable. This mitigates the nightmare of modification to existing rules when the Java version changes. Simple matter of changing the environmental variable value, and CIS runs fat dumb and happy (and not knowing anything different). The latter because I excised SVCHOST from CIS default inclusion in the ‘Windows System Application’ File Group. IF SVCHost gets hacked somehow - God forbid - and one is in a world of hurt in that ‘Windows System Application’ has carte blanche GOD permissions to do anything and go anwhere. A custom D+ policy for SVCHost has been implemented, and it has its own set of firewall rules (that I zealously maintain to ensure wherever its phoning home to, or whatever its doing, is legit).