Could someone please explain the purpose of \device\LanmanRedirector? I understand it has something to do with protected files/folders, but I don’t understand what the device level means and how this is used by the system. So far, I have received two alerts since I added it. One from Thunderbird and another for my download manager.
I wanted to ask you how to configure to protect all reagistry files at once, so CFP doesn’t fail any test anymore when it comes to self-protection?
Also, let’s suppose you click always allow for everything so that rootkit EZ is allowed to crash CFP 3.0-will then CFP 3.0’s self-protection be able to prevent unhooking caused by rookits (in this case rootkit EZ?
The good example I saw with Online Armor where an rootkit in test (real rooktit) was able to terminate HIPS of Online Armor, but Online Armor’s self-protection was able resist unhooking caused by rootkit.
What do you think?
Sorry, I am not Egemen, but I am interested in something, How Online Armor’s self-protection was able resist unhooking caused by rootkit? What is its HIPS, Part of some other application?
I think that rootkit isn’t interested in OA fancy GUI at all…
If rootkit loads its dirty *.sys, nobody can stop it from causing damage.
At “ring0” level everything can be “unhooked” and crashed…
Somebody correct me if I am wrong
See the Rootkit Agent.EY test- Online armor detects the attempt to install a service/driver, but is not able to prevent its loading. But although service is running, Online Armor is not ‘killed’, thanks to its self-protection. No full SSDT restore.Its detection abilities are partially affected (4 hooks gone to the rootkit; those related to registry protection), but the rootkit couldn’t ‘kill’ Online Armor, unlike what this rootkit does with some other programs in this comparative. It is an illustration of the self-protection mechanism implemented in Online Armor.
I will send e-mail to this guy who tested those HIPS once again to finally see how does Comodo’s HIPS fare against these malware (these are real maklware by the way, I honestly don’t know how did he test them)
But I seek for help here as well. I need someone who who knows english more than I do (more professional in language and vocabulary) so this guy named Nicola (I think that’s his name) finally tests Comodo’s HIPS
Any help is welcome.
Yep. Once the driver is loaded, the game is literally over. The others are probably refreshing their SSDT hooks which is a useless trick. if you load a driver, you can always bypass a HIPS. So drivers must be prevented from being loaded in the first place. That driver is doing much more than it is shown in the test web site. It is literally infesting the system without being detected.
So the harm was done. It can even update itself without being caught after that point just to bypass known HIPSs.
Edit: Please update to CFP 3.0.17.304 if you havent done so yet
Hi egemen, I still don,t see \Device\LanmanRedirector added to my porotected files in latest version. Does that mean CFP is still vulnerable to this rootkit?
So they included it in Disk Access in latest version? I don,t see any such info from egemen. He just seemed referring to the meaning of \device\LanmanRedirector. Are u sure?
Regtest.exe still crashes, was there ever a fix for this. The test restarts your system, so I can’t fill in the and send the problem box that CIS is giving. Man, this sure drops my confidence in this software, failing the first test I try.
egemen, you are right that once the driver is loaded, it is game over basically. my concern then, is over the method used to prevent the driver from loading. defense+ seems to rely on 3 different filters to prevent the driver from loading:
device driver
registry
protected files/folders
is it not possible to update defense+ to rely only on the first module? the number of registry entries that could be used to load drivers is vast! to include protection against every possible such entry would greatly increase the number of popups. the same is true of #3. plus, couldn’t someone modify the trojan slightly and take advantage of another line in the registry or another vulnerable folder directory that hasn’t yet been added? if the device driver filter was strengthened, wouldn’t that stop such rootkits far more effectively?