This approach is wrong. If you control "\Device\Afd\EndPoint" you have a lot of the false positives and mislead the users with the wrong alerts (or cause their programs to work incorrectly if this device is blocked).
To handle this situation gracefuly you need to control "\Device\RawIp" at TDI level. Unlike "\Device\Afd\EndPoint" this brings a lot less false positives and much more meaningful security alerts. Usually programs do not need to use this device.
Needless to say this is what OA does for a very long time already 
This particular test just passively sniffs the traffic and poses no real risks. Internet Traffic is ASSUMED to be SNIFFED all the time anyway. As soon as your packet leaves your PC, it can be sniffed by anyone else. It is not a threat at all.
There are many ways in windows and recently with windows Vista that can be used to
sniff the traffic AND ACTUALLY SEND custom packets bypassing the weak firewalls. CIS filters the ones that can be used to bypass the firewalls by crafting packets.
Note:
I remember your username from wilders forum. Some of your posts about COMODO, trying to be technical, were misleading (willingly or unwillingly) and clearly wrong. E.g. CLT DuplicateHandle tests with DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS being no threat at all(Perhaps because your product was failing?).
I did not pay too much attention but If you are affiliated with the development of the product you are advocating, we can have a technical discussion in detail.
Otherwise you should thank COMODO as a user that because of our leak tests, your company is trying to cover some of the real threats.